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Abstract 
Collective action in the form of industrial conflict has declined 
dramatically since the high tide in the 1970s in Europe. This article 
argues that this decline is the result of significant changes in both 
economic and institutional factors, influencing the calculations of 
employees and of their organizations deliberating collective action. 
Institutional factors are especially important for understanding still 
persisting inter-country variance, and they point to a novel industrial 
conflict calculus for employees. This calculus seems to entail a more 
restricted use, but not the withering away of the strike. 
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A. Introduction 
 
In the 1970s, European employers and employees lost on average just 
over 400 (417) working days for every 1,000 employees due to industrial 
conflict (IC).1 In the 1980s this figure dropped to around 200, and in the 
1990s, it dropped again to 57 and now in the 2000s, this figure is down 
to 50 days lost, a ten times drop from the level of the strike-haunted 
1970s (Table 0). In absolute figures, the number of working days lost 
(WDL) due to IC has come tumbling down from 48 million in the 1970s 
to just 6.7 million days today. 
Part of the immediate explanation would seem to be the absence of very 
large and prolonged strikes, such the British Miners’ strike in 1984 and 
the large strikes in Italy and Spain in the 1970s and 1980s. But even 
discarding these large strikes, even the underlying trend of shorter and 
minor strikes seems to be declining: In Denmark, for instance, even 
discarding large conflicts in the period from 1970 to 2003, the level for 
WDL has dropped from around 70 per year to 40, i.e. almost by half 
(Scheuer 2004: 6).  
Similarly, while in the 1970s and early 1980s, researchers would write 
about the ‘Resurgence of Class Conflict’ (Crouch & Pizzorno 1978) or 
‘Strikes and Class Conflict in Capitalist Societies’ (Korpi 1979), 
sometimes priding themselves with high, sometimes with low strike 
levels on their home turf, such language seems to have more or less 
evaporated from present-day academic publishing. Now, when authors 
do touch upon the subject, titles come more in versions of ‘Peace in 
Europe’ (Edwards & Hyman 1994) or ‘The Worst Record in Europe?’ 
(Rigby & Aledo 2001), nothing to be proud of, so it would seem.  
 
Table 0 
Average number of working days lost (WDL) per year due to 
industrial conflict (IC) in 15 European countries. Decades from 1970  
 
  
 
Period 
Dependent 
employment 
Working 
days lost 
 
Simpple 
average 
 
Weighted 
average 
 ’000s ’000s Day lost  
/1,000 
Employees 
1970-79 115,342 48,280 351 417 
1980-89 129,807 25,947 175 201 
1990-99 147,640 8,278 70 57 
2000-03 142,511 7,257 44 53 
Source: ILO, see appendix. 
Note: Simple average is average of averages of countries (average disregarding country 
size). Weighted average is based on country averages by number in dependent 
employment. Countries are those with available data for almost the whole period. 
Countries are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany (Western Germany 
until 1993), Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom. 
                                                      
1 A list of abbreviations is found on page 2. 
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So whatever happened to strikes? Have strikes and IC really withered 
away? Are workers so content with wages and conditions that strikes are 
no longer a reasonable option? Or has the working class simply 
disappeared as a political force, and the strike with it, as some of the 
gloomiest pessimists have it (Crouch 2004: 53-7).2 Not quite. Two things 
should be borne in mind: 
First, newspaper reports about spectacular strikes by workers faced with 
companies outsourcing production lines to low-pay (or maybe just lower 
pay) countries are still about. Whether protesting against EU regulations 
allowing imports of cheaper commodities from inside or outside the EU, 
against moving production lines to third countries, against the 
privatization of public enterprises and utilities, or against the closing of 
factories following other restructuring measures by management, the 
strike still seems to be one valid form of expression and protest for 
employees (and not only for blue-collar workers).  
Second, pay formation in many European countries still takes the form 
of some kind of local collective bargaining (CB), and these bargaining 
processes still seem to contain an impetus for local short-term strike 
activity, whether official or unofficial. In an interesting study, Elvander 
has compared local wage formation in four sectors of the economy in 
Sweden and the UK, coming up with some striking similarities, despite 
the well-known major institutional differences between the two countries 
(Elvander 1992).3  
Changes have taken place, but IC is still a fact of life of European 
employment relations. In this article I shall attempt to diagnose some of 
the changes involved and some of their implications, by taking a 
descriptive macro-comparative look at strikes in Europe in the period 
from 1970 to 2003, attempting to answer the following empirical 
questions: 
• What is more precisely the incidence and prevalence of strikes in 
Europe today and what is the extent to which they are declining? 
• Do European strike patterns converge or diverge? 
• Can we discern ‘national models’ in the strike patterns observed, 
i.e. is there a ‘Nordic model’, a ‘Latin model’, ‘an Anglo-Saxon 
Model’, a ‘German Speaking Model’, or does this kind of 
modelling make no sense at all? 
Before going into these issues, the next sections contain a theoretical 
discussion of strikes and IC, their definition and their causes or 
motivations, seen from different theoretical vantage points. Then follow 
the comparative analyses, and finally the article discusses which 
explanations one can plausibly give to the trends we can observe 
concerning strikes and IC? 
 
                                                      
2 In his most recent book, Crouch, the one-time editor with Pizzorno of ‘The Resurgence 
…’ (1978) has neither strikes nor IC in the index (Crouch 2004: 128-35).  
3 Unfortunately, this work of Elvander’s hasn’t been translated into English. 
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B. The Strike and the Right to Strike 
 
The strike is ‘a temporary stoppage of work by a group of employees in 
order to express a grievance or enforce a demand’ (Hyman 1972: 17). 
All parts of the definition have significance: 
• The strike is temporary, i.e. the purpose of the employees by the 
end of the strike (no matter the outcome of the strike, victory or 
defeat) is to return to the same work at the employer, and the 
employer normally expects the same. Longer lasting strikes may 
still result in the work stoppage becoming permanent, e.g. if the 
strikers are laid of or if the company goes bankrupt. 
• The strike is a special type of collective action (CA), and it 
involves at least a group of employees, because one individual’s 
work stoppage in protest against something is not considered as 
a strike. 
• It is a complete work stoppage, and by this is different from 
other types of actions such as work-to-rules or overtime bans. 
• It is also important that we are talking about employees, since CA 
from other groups in the society ( when for instance French 
wine growers establish road blockades protesting cheap Italian 
or Spanish wine, or when students are boycotting classes in 
schools) are only referred to as strikes as analogy. 
• Finally the strike is not an impulsive, but rather a measured, 
calculating, and rational action, used to achieve something (to force 
through a demand, hamper the demand of the counterpart or 
express a protest). 
The corresponding right of conflict of the employers (and 
countermeasure to the strike) is the lockout, and the intersection of 
strikes and lockouts is called labour disputes. Today lockouts generally 
only occur in connection with large official conflicts over renewal of 
collective agreements, but it most definitely wasn’t always like this (cf. 
for Scandinavia: Mikkelsen 1998: 269-70). 
One of the basic rights, which organized employees and their unions 
often emphasize, is the right of free bargaining including the right to 
strike. This right certainly have not always been a given, neither 
historically in our own part of the world, nor if you take a broader world-
view . 
This right certainly have not always been a given, neither historically in 
our own part of the world, nor if you move a little further out – in 
countries with less democratic governments, e.g. fascist or communist 
dictatorships. It is well known that it was just as illegal to strike in 
Franco-Spain as it was in the Soviet Union, even though the reasons in 
the two places formally were different. 
However it is not only the unions and its members who ascribe great 
significance to the right to strike. In every Democratic state this right is 
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recognised as something entirely fundamental, even though this 
recognition has quite different shapes: In some countries the right to 
strike is explicitly and specifically committed to the legislation, 
sometimes even in the Constitution (as for instance in Germany and 
France), in other countries the right to strike springs more implicitly or 
indirectly from legal practice of the courts and the legislators, as for 
instance in the UK and in Denmark, where the right to strike has never 
been laid down by law. The view in these countries have been that what 
is not directly illegal is allowed, and furthermore – especially in Denmark 
– that the deal struck in the September Compromise in 1899 (upheld 
since in every version of the Main Agreement between two main 
confederations, cf. Due et al. 1994; Scheuer 1998a) about the peace 
obligation when a collective agreement is in place implies that when 
there is no CB agreement (as e.g. when the agreement has expired), the 
peace clause has also expired or is non-existent, and, by implication, 
employees have the right to strike. This also counts for companies not 
covered by collective agreements (Due et al. 1994; Scheuer 1998a). 
Neither in Denmark nor in the UK has the missing legislation to 
safeguard the right to strike caused employees not to strike, though. 
Quite to the contrary over long periods of time these countries been 
haunted by strikes, and it is therefore tempting to say that this difference 
between direct and indirect rights to strike does not hold much 
significance. On the other hand, the fact the in Germany, political strikes 
are illegal (because they aim not to improve collective agreements, but to 
influence government or parliament) would appear to be part of the 
explanation of the substantial and persistent differences between France, 
Italy and Spain on the one hand and Germany on the other (cf. section F 
below). Also in the UK, changes in legislation in the 1980s do seem to 
have had a significant institutional impact (Elgar & Simpson 1993).4 
Strikes are not without costs, and that definitely goes for both parts of 
the conflict, and eventually for third parties too, these being the 
company’s subcontractors and customers, patients, clients or pupils, 
even university students, and also the families of the strikers and society 
in general. The companies lose earnings and possibly market shares, the 
employees lose their wages and the unions lose the money they have to 
spend on supporting the striking workers. Often the strike is used as a 
threat, certainly among some groups of employees; however deciding 
whether or not to strike is never easy. Partly there are economic costs, as 
mentioned above, partly there are costs in the shape of the relationship 
between the striking employees and the managers is bound to suffer, 
which might pester the working environment for a short or long period 
of time after the strike’s ending. 
As a civic right the strike as a collective right can be considered as basic 
as the individual right to hand in his resignation, to quit, i.e. to take the 
‘exit option’ (Hirschman 1970). Neither has this right existed at all times 
and in all societies. During slavery and serfdom the workforce was 
bound to the employer (the slave-owner, the feudal landlord), and it was 
basically the same way in the Soviet Union. The resignation is typically 
                                                      
4 Public-sector strike bans in the USA also have effects, cf. Hebdon & Stern 1998; 2003. 
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for good, while the strike always is temporary, but it goes equally for 
both rights that they – to benefit the one who exercises it – that it not 
necessarily must be exercised, and definitely should not be exercised too 
often. If the strike is being used to often, then it might become self-
destructive, however this might presuppose a specific perspective on 
society and on the company. Therefore it can be useful to first 
investigate some of the different perspectives on society and on 
companies, to understand the different perspectives you find on strikes 
as a phenomenon. 
 
C. The anatomy of the strike: motivations, 
explanations 
 
Considering contributions explaining the patterns, outcomes and 
motivations of IC, theories and perspectives abound. Fundamentally one 
may view the following strand of theory as the most basic: the unitary 
perspective, conflict theory, systems theory and CA theory are four basic 
approaches to the study of IC, and they will be discussed in the 
following.  
 
THEORIES OF STRIKES AND INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 
 
1. The unitary perspective (and HRM) 
2. Conflict theory  
2.a. Pluralist theory 
2.b. Marxist theory 
3. Systems theory 
4. Collective action theory  
4.a. Mobilization theory 
4.b. Institutionalist labour market theory  
 
In this section, these perspectives will be discussed in the same order as 
they appear above, and will be decided on how they can be used in 
understanding and interpreting strikes as phenomenon. 
 
1. The Unitary Perspective (and HRM) 
In this perspective the organizations and companies are viewed as based 
on the fundamental premise that all employees in a company share the 
same idea about what the goal of the company is, and that every thus 
basically work towards the same goal. This automatically excludes the 
existence of conflicts between the employees, or at least conflicts with 
any fair or legitimate basis. 
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The assumption is that all employees – by accepting employment in the 
company – have bound himself or herself to the goal of the company, 
and that they therefore identify with that or these goals, goals that are 
often stated as greater profit, greater market share, better quality of own 
products or own service, and good working conditions. The employees 
of the company are thereby (or are considered) a team, which must work 
together on a joint assignment, or in more extreme cases as ‘one big 
family’, and in such perspective there is no room for to opposing parties. 
There is no room for TU and especially strikes in such a perspective on 
companies, because it essentially is the management’s job to make sure 
that everything works in the best interest of everybody in the team/ the 
company. The moment the employee decides to sign a contract about 
making himself available to the company for a salary, the interests of 
employee and the company are a priori identical. This viewpoint is the 
basis of much economic theory, but as mentioned earlier for some of the 
rational organizational theory , e.g. for both Taylorism and Elton Mayo’s 
Human Relations School (cf. Brown 1992: 44-6; Hyman & Brough 1975; 
Scott 2003: 31-82; Scheuer 2000: 43-89), and in more recent 
organizational theory – if one excepts the Marxist interval in the 1970s, 
e.g. with Braverman’s labour process theory contribution - the concept 
of open conflicts appears as something clearly negative and most often 
irrational, nearly pathological (as in for instance Elton Mayo, but in many 
later contributors too). 
Yet strikes and especially conflicts between employees and management 
do occur to a great extent in companies too, how then can this be 
explained? The explanation with pathology was not very far-reaching 
after all. In unitary theory this is explained by the fact that one or more 
of the parties in the companies have not done their job properly. It is not 
the system as such that is wrong, but the manner in which some actors 
perform their duties: 
 
• the lack of management skills by management, 
• the lack of or poor communication between the different parties 
about goals or methods, 
• the employees’ lack of understanding of the concept of shared 
interests,  
• or simply oppositional attitudes by employees, for instance for 
political reasons. 
 
Conflicts and strikes are therefore in this perspective basically seen as 
caused by the fact that one or more of the parties have not done their 
job properly, or that they have an aim, that legitimately does not coincide 
with the aim of the company. This is a classic theory in economic theory 
and organizational theory, but it is definitely not outdated. Much of 
modern management in large, maybe especially American companies like 
IBM, HP and others, is based on a management philosophy that clearly 
subscribes to the unitary perspective: It is simply not legitimate to air 
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views that might collide with the views of the company or the 
management. Or in other words: There is no room for disagreement, 
when the management have put forward its views. Modern management 
philosophies e.g. theories on organizational culture or on Human 
Resource Management (HRM) are in many cases also considered as 
belonging to the unitary perspective (e.g. Bratton & Gold 1999). 
One consequence of the unitary perspective is a view on open conflicts 
and strikes as irrational, as something a healthy personnel policy or a 
good management ought to be able to prevent, or as something that 
stems from politically motivated opposition activity on the side of show 
stewards and activists (these being then ‘out of pedagogical reach of even 
the best HRM policy’). Actually you could label the perspective an 
autocratic or authoritarian perspective, since it monopolizes discourse 
inside the company, as critique and expressions of special interests is 
definitely considered illegitimate. A manifestly practiced unitary 
perspective inside companies is therefore actually often suppressing the 
legitimate interest of the employees in different areas, sometimes only a 
few, sometimes several, as the premise of the unitary theory about an 
ideal world - where the management is taking care of everybody 
relations, including the ones of the employees, in a fair way – is certainly 
out of sync with reality most places. 
Unitary theorists will say to this that one should make an effort to reach 
this ideal, while others will argue that the continuingly occurring conflicts 
(and strikes) in the companies show that have to be other and more 
fundamental factors playing a part than the parties’ lack of understanding 
of their own interests. In fact an important partial reason with the unitary 
theorists for the fact that the world do not always behave as they say, is 
the irrationality of the parties. This however is obviously not satisfying: 
Of course individuals and small groups can behave irrationally and harm 
themselves for a longer period of time, but after all it is difficult to 
imagine that this would go for larger groups of people, e.g. employees in 
companies.   
 
2. Conflict Theory 
Conflict theory and conflict perspectives are based on a more realistic 
fundamental premise (Clegg 1976; Jackson 1987; Walsh 1983): that 
conflicts exist in a society and in companies, and that it is necessary to 
have a theoretical frame and a system of theoretical terminology to 
understand conflicts not just declare them as irrational or based on 
subjective, political-irrelevant or simply inferior motives. In IR research 
the view is that a significant source of conflict is the perception about 
antagonistic contradiction of interests between owners/management on 
the one hand and the ordinary employees on the other. In companies 
conflicts may arise because of differences in value systems, in the 
understanding of the situation or more basically different interests in the 
management–employee relationship. This understanding has among 
other things been the basis of the entire developmen
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system of the labour market, the existence of TU, of collective 
agreements, of representatives (with job protection) etc. 
All this institutional order actually includes an institutionalized accept of 
the conflict perspective, as the TU legitimately can put forward demands 
that cut across the goals and interests that the management create. In 
doing so a institutional legitimizing of a ‘counter discourse’ takes place, 
that can make it possible for the employees to openly discuss the things 
in the company, that are the roots to their dissatisfaction. 
Significant strands of conflict theory are (a) pluralist theory and (b) 
Marxist theory. 
2.a. Pluralist theory  
A moderate version of the conflict theory is made up of the pluralist 
theory. Here it is first and foremost acknowledged that occurrences of 
conflicts are an integrated and legitimate part of society and the 
companies, since both society and companies must accept that they 
consist of groups of people, who can have different and at times very 
divergent conceptions of what their own interests are, what values that 
should be the basis for the individual as well as for the CA, in society and 
in the world of work. Thus it is assumed – contrary to Marxist theory – 
that the interests of the parties at work can be both converging and 
diverging, and that they will often be converging in some areas and 
diverging in other. Furthermore contrary to Marxist theory it is assumed 
that the interests of the actors is expressed by themselves and therefore 
must be uncovered empirically (the can not be determined by priori, i.e. 
as a premise that does not have to be proven, as is in for instance 
Marxism). Finally – and contrary to the unitary perspective – is of course 
important, that conflicts are not just caused by coincidence or 
irrationality by the actors, but that difference in opinion in companies 
can be caused by fundamental different objective conditions or 
subjective values, i.e. objective differences in working conditions, salary 
conditions, working hours etc., or in subjective interpretations of these 
differences or of, which values and norms for good practice ought to be 
in effect. 
The consequence of this view or perspective will be that companies 
presumably always will be influenced by conflicts and negotiations, in 
which the more or less contradictory interests and attitudes can be bend 
and adjusted to one another. In this perspective strikes will then occur, 
when such negotiations for one reason or the other fail, which may be 
caused for various reasons. They might also occur, if one of the parties’ 
interests become so deeply violated that this party almost sees it 
necessary to react more aggressively, e.g. in the case of mass dismissals.  
Pluralist theory has many supporters because it fits quite well with reality, 
and also corresponds to the prevailing democratic model for our 
understanding of the society. Yet it might be so terribly good at 
predicting, why some strike more than others, but it points to the need 
for empirically to map the connection between differences in values and 
attitudes on the one side and the incidence and prevalence of strikes on 
the other. 
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2.b. Marxist theory 
One of the best known conflict theories is Marx’ economic theory on 
exploitation and class struggle. Marx’ theory states that society basically 
only consists of two antagonistic social classes, the working class and the 
bourgeoisie. In this conceptualization workers will always be subject to 
exploitation, placing them antagonistically in opposition to the owners of 
capital. Thereby strikes were always well-founded, but this was a moral 
judgement, not one based upon an assessment of the specific origin of a 
particular strike, but from the interpretation that the workers have 
already been ‘robbed’ by the employers, thus they always have the right 
to strike in retaliation. 
One might have thought that this highly simplified idea had been 
challenged in the matter that not too many workers themselves have this 
idea of having been robbed. Marxism’s solution to this was to declare 
that the workers suffered from ‘false consciousness’ and consequently 
could not pursue their ‘objective interests’. 
Marxism is, however, not a consistent conflict theory. The political idea 
was that when workers had conquered political power then subsequently 
they would no longer have any reason to strike: thus, it is not surprising 
that strikes were outlawed in the Soviet Union and in the former Eastern 
Europe states, quite in parallel with the fascist dictatorships in Europe, 
e.g. Nazi-Germany, Franco-Spain etc. 
As social science theory, Marxism was not particularly useful, since it did 
not contribute to the explanation of, why some countries had a higher 
strike frequency than others, why some trade groups were striking more 
than others etc.  
 
3. Systems theory 
A somewhat different perspective on labour market relations and strikes 
is put forward in the so-called systems theory, which first and foremost 
is linked to the American labour market researcher J. T. Dunlop’s work 
(Dunlop 1958, cf. Due et al. 1994) 
The main point in systems theory is that the labour market system is 
viewed as a system, which on the input side consists of collective actors 
(TU, EA, state bureaucracies etc.), contexts (e.g. technological or 
economical opportunities or limitations), and ideology, which is the set 
of ideas that the parties share despite difference in attitudes and interests. 
The systemic aspect then is the fact that the disagreements, which might 
exist between the collective actors can be ‘played out’ and settled in a 
process field consisting of CB, negotiations, participation, mediation and 
arbitration. The results of the procedures will typically be rules (e.g. 
agreement renewals in relation to the CB agreements) and settlements 
(case law). These rules and settlements feed back to the collective actors 
and into the system, where it influences these actors and even their 
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ideologies, resulting (hopefully) in a strengthening of the system, cf. 
Figure 1. 
Systems theory assumes that collective actors exist, and not least that 
they find it rational to take part in the continuation of the system and not 
least its expansion. Inside the rules that the system produce; rationality is 
increased by the shared system, which leads to better functioning labour 
market. Hence the system will assist in decreasing the incidence and 
prevalence of strikes and lockouts, because the parties instead of open 
conflicts rationally will chose less costly and straining ways of settling 
their conflicting interests, namely through the negotiation and mediation 
system. 
 
Figure 1. 
Dunlop’s system model  
 
 
Source: Green 1994: 7 
In one very extensive and encompassing version of systems theory Due 
et al. assume that a highly system-influenced labour market as the Danish 
labour market is based on: 
1. “a comprehensively organised labour market with strong 
organisations, both for workers and employers on both sides, 
2. a centralized collective bargaining process, leading to the 
conclusion of agreements which cover virtually the entire 
Danish labour market […], 
3. a consensus-based relationship between the opposing organisations, a 
relatively low level of work stoppages and other forms of industrial action, 
and 
4. agreement-based regulation of virtually all conditions on the 
labour market via the voluntary system of collective bargaining 
rather than legislation, which is applied only to a very limited 
extent” (italics added, Due et al. 1994: 12). 
The theory may look intuitive, but is blemished by a significant lack of 
plain and simple realism: To talk of “agreement-based regulation of 
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virtually all conditions on the labour market” is actually quite unrealistic 
in any European nation state today: How could unemployment even 
exist? Would that be decided and regulated by the organizations of 
employees and employers? Furthermore, while in many countries the 
relationship between unions and employers’ associations could be seen 
as based on some kind of mutual understanding, speaking of a consensus 
in all significant matters really appears somewhat overdone. That might be 
stretching the consensus that actually does exist about the rules systems 
for the outplaying of conflicts (i.e. the procedural relations), a bit too far.  
There probably is consensus about (large parts of) the sets of rules 
pertaining to industrial and employment relations, but when it comes to 
the substance, i.e. the content of collective agreements or the demands 
related to e.g. pay bargaining, the parties are almost certainly at variance 
in the majority of cases.  
Systems theory predicts that a strong systemic regulation will lead to a 
low level of IC, i.e. the stronger the institutions are, the smaller the 
incidence and prevalence of strikes will be. We shall return to this issue 
in the next sections. 
More generally one can say about Dunlop’s systems theory, that it was 
developed in the USA in the late 1950s, from the assumption that the 
system would evolve and become stronger in the decades to come. 
Unfortunately it is necessary to point out that IR institutions in Dunlop’s 
home country have developed in the diametrically opposite direction. 
Unionization in the US is at an all-time low, and as a consequence the 
American institutionalized IR system has become gradually more 
marginalized - to a level, where CB coverage (which in the US roughly 
corresponds to the level of unionization) is at 18% of the labour force 
(Traxler 1994: 173; Visser 1994: 99). The actors – and possibly the 
employers in particular –in other words have not considered it 
particularly expedient to act in accordance with the bargaining system, 
they would rather exclude the TU from the workplaces, in which they to 
a considerable extent have succeeded. This development is obviously 
highly unfortunate, but it is also unfortunate for systems theory, because 
in makes it clear that the theory can not explain why some individual 
actors, e.g. companies or individual employees, do not wish to become 
part of a system of collective actors and thus contribute to and 
participate in the system, and thereby systems theory has made itself 
blind to some of the weaknesses that may have been built into the 
American IR system. 
Is the theory more suitable for Europe, then? One must be very sceptical 
here, first because as mentioned earlier systems theory seems blind to the 
weak sides of the system, but mainly seems to be celebrating it,5 and 
second because the theory neither has concepts for the interaction 
between individual and collective actors, nor for the interaction between 
the more rational and economic considerations on the one side and the 
more value based, joined considerations (and changes herein) on the 
other.  
                                                      
5 This is expressed in the ‘national pride’ of those forwarding their national ‘models’ and 
ideals for the world to follow. 
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So even if systems theory has had its share of supporters, and still has 
some, one must say that it has seen its prime, and is mainly of historical 
interest today. 
 
4. Collective action theory 
Some of the newer sociological and political social theory chooses a 
somewhat different type of explanation models in viewing IC and strikes, 
namely the category of theories that often is referred to as CA theory, or 
the problem of CA). Here the basis of the theory is the fact collective 
organizations such as TU and EA and CA such as strikes contain a 
problem or a paradox, namely the fact that participation in e.g. a strike 
probably in many cases can be for the greater good of (rational for) all 
the participating workers, while for the individual worker it will often be 
more profitable (individually rationally) not to participate or contribute. 
The paradox has been expressed most succinctly by Jon Elster: 
 
• Each individual derives greater benefits under conditions of 
universal cooperation than under conditions of universal 
noncooperation, [but] 
• Each individual derives more benefits if he abstains from 
cooperation, regardless of what others do (Elster 1985: 139). 
 
The reason for this is that the result in these cases, benefits, that will be 
available to everyone, no matter if they have participated and thus always 
will benefit the individual, while the contribution of the individual is 
marginal to the collective effort, i.e. to the production of the result 
(whether 100 or only 99 participate makes no difference for the success 
of a strike), while the contribution (e.g. in shape of lost salary) is not 
marginal to the individual. 
The existence of collective organizations or CA to represent groups with 
objectively common interests are therefore not just a given, which is 
emphasized by the fact that the levels of union density in the Western 
democracies are extremely different: From 10-15% in for instance the 
US and France to over 75% in for instance Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden (Kjellberg 2001; Strøby Jensen 2004: 8; Visser 1999). How one 
in practice attempts to tackle and solve the problem of CA has hereby 
become an essential issue in the social sciences (important recent 
discussions and debates are Gold 1997 and Kelly 1998. See also Crouch 
1982; Olson 1965; 1982; Knoke 1988). 
For this branch of theory one central issue problem is how one can 
understand and explain that individual actors unite and act collectively 
on some occasions and in some situations, but not in other. In other 
words the former theorists somewhat naïve conceptions have been 
abandoned. The conceptions that collective organizations were ‘natural’ 
phenomena, whose existence and activities did not need to be explained, 
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to see that these activities as socially constructed results of specific 
human considerations, actions and experiences, and one tries to 
contribute to the understanding of, in which situations the individual 
actor voluntarily will hand over his or her resources or time to a group or 
a collective organization, or participate in a CA, even though certain 
aspects in the actions of the individual causes it to be seen as a sacrifice 
for the group. When will the individual make a sacrifice for the group, 
and when not? And how can the understanding of this contribute to the 
understanding of the affiliation with collective organizations such as TU 
(and EA) and with CA such as strikes. Systems theory simply assumes 
that the actors by nature will act collectively. It is this assumption that 
the CA theories deal with. Economic theory is also based on rationality 
assumptions, yet economic theory primarily deals with the individual 
choices of the actors, while sociological CA theory deals with how 
human behaviour basically is collective by nature, and is highly 
influenced by collective actors (cf. Crouch 1982: 41). 
Two important contributions to this discussion, especially when in 
comes to CA and strikes, are the mobilization theory and institutional 
labour market theory. 
4.a. Mobilization theory 
This theory or group of theories are based on the assumption that actors, 
both individual and collective actors, make up their mind about 
participation in actions based on a number of ponderings of the possible 
outcome and risks associated with the action. The condition for the 
individuals interests to peak with the interests of the others, is that there 
are some shared fundamental interests (i.e. objective collective 
circumstances), that there is some sort of organization, that there is 
process involving mobilization of resources, and that there is 
“opportunity”, i.e. an apparently favourable opportunity for CA. This 
theory is especially linked with American sociologist Charles Tilly (1984; 
2004, cf. also the classic Shorter & Tilly 1974; and Tilly & Tilly 1981) and 
the Swedish sociologist Walter Korpi (Korpi 1984; Korpi & Shalev 
1979). In the Scandinavian context, this theory has been represented by 
Mikkelsen (1992: 28-39). 
Mobilization theory however covers other issues than strikes and IC. In 
recent historical literature it also covers hunger strikes and revolts, and in 
sociological literature for instance different protest movements, from 
activism such as occupation of housing and other civil disobedience to 
collecting signatures and membership of environmental movements etc. 
(e.g. Knoke 1988;) 
Mikkelsen’s large study of IC in Scandinavia since 1848 (Mikkelsen 1992) 
among other things showed that exactly unionization was a crucial 
prerequisite for the former labour movement to progress from purely 
spontaneous and improvised (sometimes provoked) types of actions, 
which often led to defeat. When the workers finally had become 
organized in TU the problem of CA had been partly solved, and the 
workers now could work up greater consensus about when to strike, as 
well as there was greater opportunity to rationally consider if it in a given 
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situation was wise to strike, and there was also better resources; since the 
new TU worked up strike funds (as well as sick-benefit associations, 
funeral funds and unemployment funds, however that is a whole other 
story). 
But why did the workers not become increasingly good at striking as the 
number of TU members increased? When one supports Tilly’s theory 
with the ground-braking contribution of Walter Korpi, one can put 
forward the following interpretation. The aim of the strike naturally was 
to improve the conditions of the working class, however the stronger the 
TU and the Social Democratic Party became, the more possible it 
became for the workers to promote the their interests via the 
parliamentary road, therefore the political strike became less and less 
necessary and legit. It became less rational to strike, if the same aims 
could be reached via the political road. This theory has however also 
been subject to criticism, and the mobilization theory - despite improved 
explanations for the occurrence of IC and strikes – to a certain extent 
gives a convincing explanation to comparative strike patterns. Here one 
has to point out that the theories still have not come that far, and maybe 
never do. 
Theoretically the problem with the mobilization theory is furthermore 
that it maybe to a to large extent focuses on the political strike and the 
political revolt, i.e. on historically rather rare occurrences, and to a lesser 
extent on trade oriented strikes in spite of the fact that they are much 
more common, either local strikes directed at the individual company or 
national strikes as a step in the renewal of collective agreements. Hereby 
the mobilization theory still separated itself quite far from the individual 
actor and even also from the local collective, the individual TU etc., and 
took on an almost meta historical view on strikes and CA. 
4.b. Institutional labour market theory 
This term covers a number of theories, which originate partly in Mancur 
Olson’s book about problems of CA (Olson 1965), partly in Colin 
Crouch’s use of these theories on TU and strikes (Crouch 1982), to 
which has come a large number of recent theoretical and empirical 
contributions, which from these describe and analyze the collective 
organizations and actions of the labour market either nationally or 
comparatively (i.e. in comparisons between nations (cf. et al Clegg 1976; 
Edwards & Hyman 1994; Hyman 2000).  
According to this theory one should view the individual institutions of 
the labour market (i.e. its TU, employers’ association, labour law, CB 
agreements, institutions of arbitration and mediation etc.) as a network 
of rules and regulations, which makes up the frame for both 
considerations and actions of single actors and collective actors. The 
understanding of the institutions to some degree draw on Dunlop’s 
systems theory, but moves beyond it, because it does not presume that 
the actors impulsively and unconditionally join the unions and 
institutions, but that they on the contrary have the opportunity to chose 
to act more or less collectively in any given situation. The considerations 
and actions of the individual should be viewed also in an Olsonian 
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(Olson 1965) free-rider perspective, as any CA, for instance a strike, 
contains a significant incentive for the individual to defect. Olson argues 
that only negative selective incentives may prevent strike breaking when 
dealing with strikes, while more recent theoretical developments 
(especially Coleman 1990; Elster 1989; and inspired by this Scheuer 
2000) have emphasized how the problems with CA often practically in 
society are solved on the basis of the existence of shared social norms 
and values e.g. norms for equality or justice. 
This perspective makes it possible to obtain a more differentiated view 
on TU and strikes: when one compares strike patterns in different 
nations, then the individual nation’s concrete institutional set-up of the 
labour market plays an important role for the actual strikes patterns, 
which is why the actors incentive and action patterns are to be analyzed 
inside the institutional network of rules, which only to a limited extent 
change over time. 
As an example when it comes to strike occurrences one can think of the 
differences between Denmark and France. In Denmark union density is 
close to 80%, in France approximately 15% (Visser 1999), and on this 
basis one might assume that French workers would have very weak 
capabilities of striking. Nevertheless, this isn’t the case at all, as it is well 
known: In fact, the right to strike in France is laid down in the 
Constitution, which means that no TU can legally prevent their members 
from striking. The right to strike is the individual employee’s civic right. 
Peace-clauses are a lot less feasible in France than e.g. in Scandinavia, 
where they prevail in the organized sections of the labour market.  
The theory can also explain why there is such an extremely strong 
resentment against strike breakers in the labour movement. This is 
certainly an international phenomenon. Naturally, resentment against 
non-unionized workers also exists (being ‘sent to Coventry’, cf. Coleman 
1990: 278-85; Elster 1989), but the strike breakers often call out 
extremely strong feelings of virtually hate. Now why is that?  
This can be explained if one views the strike in game theoretical light: the 
strike is a special type of CA game, one which is especially vulnerable to 
individual defection. If for instance 75% of the workers at the workplace 
are members of the TU, this is most often more than enough for the TU 
to obtain a CB agreement and the shop stewards will then often play a 
dominant role in pay negotiations. The fact that 25% not are members 
may be a nuisance, but it does not really hamper the shop steward’s 
opportunities to do his job: The more, the better, that is obvious, but 
one can do all right without the rest. 
When it comes to the strike in most occasions this is quite different: here 
rather few strike breakers – just 5 or 10% - can result in the effect of the 
strike is virtually equal to none, because a small minority of the workers 
often can sustain deliveries, for a while at least (shown in Figure 2). 
Normally it is presumed that the more that contribute to a CA, the 
greater effect it has on “the counterpart”, often viewed as a linear effect. 
This naturally is a highly simplified assumption (cf. Elster 1989: 17-50), 
but in relation to strikes it is quite obviously wrong: here, strikers are 
dependent on the participation (non-defection) of all employees.  
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Institutional labour market theory finally can explain some of the 
apparently strange dynamics that has surrounded strikes on the labour 
market in the 20th century, namely the fact that the labour movement in 
the early stages mainly used the strike to reach its goals, which could be 
economic goals, procedural goals (acknowledgement, e.g. entering into a 
collective agreement), or political goals (protests against political 
interventions or legislation), while the increasing strength and influence 
of the TU – especially in the period after the 1970s, cf. below – was 
accompanied by a general decrease in the strike level. One might ask: 
Was the decreasing strike level an expression for a weakening of the 
workers professional consciousness, that the salaried employees would 
not strike, and that the unions therefore generally were weakened, or did 
it express that the labour movement – after being acknowledged as 
legitimate counterpart and partner in the economical and political social 
game – now had to and could find other ways to influence and results? 
The latter was the view in the significant contributions by Walter Korpi 
(Korpi 1984; Korpi & Shalev 1979; see, however, for the views on union 
roles alternate nationally Hyman 2000). These views from institutional 
theory appear rather more convincing than e.g. the theories that try to 
explain strikes from economic conditions. As Stokke & Thörnqvist show 
(2001: 256-60), the trend in unemployment is for instance not a good 
explanation for the extent of strikes.  
 
Figure 2. 
 
Theoretical effect on employer of how large a share of 
workers, who (1) are members of the trade union, and 
who (2) participate in a strike.  
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D. Summing it up: The novel IC calculus  
 
Strikes are often based on and have to be understood from rational 
calculations, imbedded in an institutional system, which to a large extent 
effects the actual calculation, not necessarily economic calculation 
however, calculations may be value-based (Hyman & Brough 1975; 
Scheuer 2000: 20-38). Not all participants in IC will agree on the 
calculation, but on these occasions the majority rules, since the CA 
otherwise becomes virtually impossible. 
Hence IC may be seen as resulting from or as expressions of: 
1. A warning or a frustration in wage negotiations over lack of 
results (the nurses reoccurring strikes can be led back to this) or 
warning to the counterpart in connection with the aggressive 
local wage negotiations with the purpose of forcing the 
counterpart to confessions (most often conflicts contrary to the 
agreement), cf. the German term of the “Warnstreik”. 
2. Frustration over large negative forced conditions, e.g. mass lay-
offs in the case of declining markets, often as a futile, yet 
comprehensible cry for help (cf. the famous Vauxhall episode, 
which so defamed the survey method in some countries).6 
3. Failed communication between the parties, misunderstandings, 
possibly caused by lack of trust. 
4. Amateurism with one or both parties. 
5. The imbedding of the negotiations in a unsuitable negotiation 
structure, e.g. when an organization is forced to join a 
negotiation cartel and subsequently feel run over by the more 
powerful others, or when a number of small organizations 
cannot coordinate, but have to negotiate separately, and no one 
dares take the first step in fear that others later will get more (as 
elaborated in Scheuer 1993). 
6. Brinkmanship by one or both sides of negotiations, leading to 
mobilization which cannot easily be called off when agreement 
is reached, as it happened in the Danish General Conflict in 
1998 (cf. Scheuer 1998b). 
7. Unsuitable organization- and negotiation structure in the shape 
of competing national unions for basically the same groups of 
employees, including border conflicts: if strong unions compete 
for members by bargaining for better results than the 
competitors have achieved (with same or similar employers), 
then conflict becomes imminent in the system (this is possibly 
one of the explanations of the high strike-frequencies in the UK 
in the 1970s). 
 
                                                      
6 At least in some countries, cf. Blackburn 1967: 47-50; Goldthorpe 1966; Goldthorpe et 
al. 1968: 195-198; Scheuer 2000: 135-9. 
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To put it in other words, there is nothing normatively or morally 
‘correct’ about the strike in itself or the aim of the strike. Strikes are 
neither morally right nor morally wrong, even if both of these views by 
themselves have many supporters, often based on their respective places 
in the bargaining system or their political views. Whether this is right or 
wrong will always depend on the analytical understanding of the calculus, 
the particular concrete situation and the foregoing negotiations. 
Often exactly the rational calculation concerning strikes does not seem 
particularly well thought out, being that the cost the parties in IC inflict 
on one another easily can exceed the possible gain. This is true when for 
instance the workers strike in connection with mass lay-offs, like the 
German automobile workers did in the fall of 2004. Why are they doing 
it? In some way they are only helping the employers, who then do not 
have to pay them salary the employers already argue is way too high! The 
are probably doing it because they feel, that the attention of the public 
needs to directed at the phenomenon with the high number of jobs 
being outsourced to third world countries. Another explanation might be 
that the TU representatives – confronted with a sizeable setback, e.g. a 
firing round – at times rather want to fight and loose than not fight at 
all.7 
The thought of rational calculation makes it possible to expect that there 
will be a decreased striking activity as the markets are being globalized 
and outsourcing of jobs is made much easier. Workplaces are simply 
much less protected by national borders than they were in the 1970s. It 
also makes it fair to expect the European nations to go against 
convergence, i.e. that their strike patterns become more and more 
similar.  
 
E. Strikes and Strikers in Europe – Issues and 
Methodology 
 
This section will take a closer look at the strike patterns, which 
empirically can be observed in the Western European countries from 
1970 up till today. Then intention is to provide a general and 
comparative, mainly descriptive presentation of the tendencies, which 
can be observed history-dynamically from the strike haunted 1970s and 
onwards, and also comparatively for illuminate how the strike patterns 
of the European labour market possibly differentiate themselves. The 
following issues will be of particular concern: 
• What is more precisely the incidence and prevalence of strikes in 
Europe today and what is the extent to which they are declining? 
Are strikes really ‘disappearing’ or are they reaching a lower, but 
constant level? 
                                                      
7 Elster 1989 
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• Do European strike patterns converge or diverge, as the EU 
gradually and increasingly influences national labour market 
legislation and as globalization makes its sway? 
• Can we still discern ‘national models’ in the strike patterns 
observed, i.e. is there a ‘Scandinavian model’, a ‘Latin model’, ‘an 
Anglo-Saxon Model’, a ‘German Speaking Model’, or does this 
kind of modelling make no sense at all? 
15 European countries have been selected for the comparative analyses, 
and in the tables they have been grouped as shown below: 
 
 
DATA BASE – COUNTRIES SELECTED FOR COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSES 
 
• Scandinavia 
o Denmark 
o Finland 
o Norway 
o Sweden 
• British Isles 
o Ireland 
o The United Kingdom 
• North-Western Continental Europe  
o Belgium 
o France 
o The Netherlands 
• Southern Continental Europe  
o Italy 
o Portugal 
o Spain 
• Central Continental Europe  
o Austria 
o Germany 
o Switzerland 
 
The reason for this selection is that all these countries have good 
statistics for all or most of the time periods covered (1970 and onwards), 
Iceland and Luxemburg have been excluded. For Greece, data in the 
main do not exist, and for the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, 
only some have strike data at the ILO and these data do not go further 
back than to the 1990s.  
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The data have been drawn from the Statistical Yearbook of the ILO, the 
International Labour Organization.8 The procedure and national 
definitions and delimitations appear in the Appendix.  
By the use of these comparisons it is important to be aware that national 
definition may vary, just as delimitations (e.g. the lower limit for when a 
strike is included in the statistics) vary quite a bit (cf. Jackson 1987; 
Stokke 1999: 27; Stokke & Thörnqvist 2001: 250-2; Walsh 1983). In this 
article no attempts have been made to compensate for these variations, 
since experiences in doing so show that it does not make much 
difference. In fact, the ILO statistics are the generally acknowledged 
resource for this information, even with the limitations that includes.  
When one wishes to calculate the strike dimensions in a specific country, 
the ILO statistics provide different options, each with its advantages and 
disadvantages: 
 
• the number of IC 
• the number of workers involved in IC and 
• the number of WDL as a result of these IC. 
 
On the basis of this one can calculate different measures for strikes, e.g. 
the following 
 
All three measures are used in comparative strike analyses in the 
theoretical literature, depending on the more particular theoretical 
interest. Thus, in a recent article about the USA, Morris (2003) applies 
the number of strikes measure to show how union organization 
influences strike activity. In this article, the main interest is in how much 
IC ‘disturbs’ ordinary production, and therefore, the last of the three 
measures - WDL – would appear to be the most relevant measure. A 
further reason for this choice would be that this measure is less ridden 
by statistical measurement problems than the other two, since 
differences in the reporting principles and practices of the countries may 
influence the ‘number of strikes’ measure more than the number of 
WDL measure.  
For this reason this article mainly focuses on the third measure, WDL, 
since this must be seen as the most real and realistic measure for the 
economic and social significance of IC, and at the same time 
methodically as the most reliable measure (cf. uses in Edwards & 
Hyman 1994: 252; Stokke & Thörnqvist 2001: 248). 
 
                                                      
8 These data are now available via: www.ilo.org, more specifically 
the statistics are at laborsta.ilo.org, a quite useful site. 
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F. Decline Whereto? 
F.1. The Overall Picture 
Table 1 shows the overall picture: Here the share of employees, who 
have been involved in IC (per 1,000 employees) shown in the top and 
the number of WDL per 1,000 employed shown at the bottom part, 
stated as averages for the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and the 2000s.  
It is quite clear from the charts that both the share of participants in IC 
and especially the number of WDL clearly have been declining markedly 
in most European countries since the 1970s (where they by the way 
reached a high point, something the chart does not show, cf. Crouch & 
Pizzorno 1978)). This is true for the Scandinavian countries, for Ireland 
and The United Kingdom, but also for some of the Southern European 
countries, especially Italy and Spain. These countries had strike 
dimensions (both measured as participating employed and as lost 
working days), which were almost twice as large as in Northern Europe, 
so in these countries (Italy and Spain) the decline is certainly much more 
dramatic. What furthermore appears is that in the middle of the chart 
(and at the centre of Europe) we find a number of countries, where 
strike incidence and prevalence are very low, first and foremost in ‘the 
Six’ (the founder members of the EU), but also in Switzerland. 
By looking at the strike dimensions from today’s vantage point, one 
might conclude that the pattern today is not all that different from what 
it was in the 1970s (countries in the high end of the scale then are also in 
the high end today), the variance having grown significantly smaller than 
in the 1970s. Whatever the causes may be, one cannot fail to conclude 
that the European labour market conditions – when it comes to IC – is 
moving significantly towards convergence. Strike patterns become still 
less differentiated over the thirty year time period from the beginning of 
the 1970s to today. The differences in IC in the part of existing EU that 
also were members before the latest expansion to the East, is possibly – 
with Italy and Spain as late-coming exceptions – are today relatively 
small. But they are still there, as it will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
 
F.2. Convergence or divergence?  
The following five tables 2-6 show WDL per country over the period 
from 1970 to 2003, as far as data are available. For the purpose of 
presentation divided into five country ‘groups’. In Table 2 for 
Scandinavia one sees that Finland has until 1986 a substantial number of 
years with a quite high number of WDL due to IC, over 1,000 in 1971, 
1973, 1976 and again in 1986. After 1986 only twice has the score 
approached 500 WDL. In Denmark, the peaks are in 1973, 1985 and 
(perhaps against the general trend) in 1998.  The 1998 Great Conflict is 
in fact the highest number of working days in any country since 1990. 
The Danish levels are lower than in Finland, but higher than both 
Norway and Sweden, but at the same time it stands out that Norway and 
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especially Sweden experienced a small increase in the 1980s and after 
that Finland and Denmark since the 1970s, for Norway and Sweden 
since the 1980s clearly have been approaching approximately the same 
low level. If Norway and Sweden had more stabile labour markets in the 
1970s than Denmark and especially Finland this difference has been 
completely levelled after the year 2000. 
The trend for the British Isles (Ireland and the UK, cf. Table 3) is 
almost completely alike and in reality very close to the Finnish 
development: A somewhat tumultuous labour market in the 1970s 
became more peaceful in the 1980s, and in the 1990s conflict level is as 
low as the level of the Central European countries, which also continues 
in the 2000s. The chart especially for the UK shows the big labour 
disputes, partly in the 1970s up to the point in 1979 when the Labour 
government was replaced by the series of conservative governments 
under Margaret Thatcher, the downward trend becoming interrupted in 
1984 by the Miners’ strike. The return of New Labour under Tony Blair 
has not broken this trend. In the UK, there seems, however surprisingly, 
almost to be industrial ‘peace in our time’. 
In North-Western Continental Europe (Table 4) a similar trend can be 
seen, both in the cases of France and Belgium. The Netherlands have a 
lower level.9 The table does show a rather different structure for the IC, 
since the highpoints are certainly not at big as in Scandinavia or on the 
British Isles, and the period since 1982 seems very peaceful and even, 
excepting one ‘blip’ in the Netherlands in 1995. Furthermore there are 
indications of an increasing trend in France in the most recent years, 
something which places France marginally higher on the aggregate scale 
than the other countries shown here, and also higher than the UK (cf. 
Table 11 below).  
As for Southern Continental Europe (Table 5) it can be seen that Spain 
and Italy as mentioned earlier had an extremely high level in the 1970s, 
but in this case there has been a drop, a very extreme drop actually, even 
though Spain has maintained a level for IC that almost corresponds to 
the Belgian-French in the 1970s. Portugal on the other hand has a quite 
peaceful labour market. What comes forward, especially for Spain, is a 
pattern of ‘waves’ and very big disputes: The first ones appear in the 
wake of the democratization era after the death of Franco, but again in 
1988 and in the beginning of the 1990s significant highpoints occur, 
with over 600 WDL (for a discussion, see Rigby & Aledo 2001). The 
Italian pattern has quite different origins and explanations, probably 
partly to do with the state’s role in upholding employment (cf. Franzosi 
1995). 
Finally we have Central Continental Europe, Germany, Switzerland and 
Austria (Table 6). The level for these three countries is extremely low, 
and it has been that way always. This may be a surprise so some, since 
sometimes IC erupts in e.g. Germany receiving substantial media 
coverage, as most recently in the case of the Opel workers in October 
                                                      
9 Please note that the scale on the vertical axis in the Figures 2-6 is not is the same: the 
strike level measured as the number of WDL in e.g. France is less than a third of e.g. the 
British. 
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2004 going a dispute about the outsourcing of jobs. The numbers then 
show that when one leaves out these mega disputes, the German labour 
market and those of Austria and Switzerland too are only hardly ever 
marred by IC. Even here certain years clearly appear as highpoints. 
Concerning Germany highpoints were 1971, 1978 and 1984. The latter 
was the year with big labour battles caused by the implementation of the 
35-hour week. As we know the trade-union movement was victorious in 
these battles. Today these accomplishments are being rolled back in 
Germany, but that is a different story. Austria did however break its 
record completely in 2003: completely in contradiction to its own 
tradition, a number of very large conflicts erupted in Austria in 2003, in 
the main political strikes against the government’s planned pension 
reforms. The Austrian Trade Union Confederation, the ÖGB, organized 
a number of very large protest strikes (similar to what is more often seen 
in France), the most far-reaching since World War II. Added to this, 
there were major strike outbreaks in the railways and the Austrian 
Airlines, resulting in an aggregate loss of 1.3 million working days, or 
400 WDL per 1,000 employees.10 
Table 7 shows the decade averages of all the countries into one table: 
this makes it possible to compare both vertically and horizontally. The 
clear picture again becomes one of convergence and of a clearly falling 
level of IC: In the 1970s countries like Italy, Spain, Ireland, the UK and 
Finland had a very high level, while Denmark, Belgium and France were 
in the middle group. Today the level is much more similar and naturally 
much lower. Convergence reigns much more, as much as the days of the 
great numbers of WDL are over. This does not imply that such conflicts 
are all but over, though. 
F.3. The European league table, then and now 
A different way of viewing this development – a way that focuses 
especially on the differences between the European countries – is to 
look at rankings. If there is s general downward trend in strike activity, it 
is interesting to see whether this trend influences all countries in equal 
measure, or if some countries change place over the decades. Thus, in 
the 1970s (table 8) Spain and Italy were positioned in the top, with the 
UK, Finland and Ireland at a high medium level, Denmark, Belgium and 
France are in the middle, while Switzerland, Portugal, Holland, Sweden, 
Norway and Germany are all in the very low end. Does this pattern 
persevere? To some extent it does. 
Looking at the 1980s (table 9), the league table is still headed by the 
same five countries (Spain, Italy, Finland, the UK and Ireland), while in 
the middle, countries like Sweden, Norway have moved somewhat up 
the scale from their very low levels in the 1970s. Maybe the ‘resurgence 
of class conflict’ came a bit later here? Otherwise, the overall ranking 
hasn’t changed much. 
                                                      
10 Se the description by the European Industrial Relations Observatory On-Line at:  
http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie/2004/01/feature/at0401203f.html  
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In the 1990s (table 10), Spain is still the most strike-prone country, but 
some large conflicts in Denmark and Finland have moved these two 
countries to the second and third place. In Denmark, just one official 
conflict (almost a general strike) incurred a levy of 1,178 WDL per 1,000 
employees,11 the highest number for any European country since 1990. 
The UK, France and Portugal, on the other hand, have become much 
more peaceful. Also Norway has moved up the scale, although not due 
to increase in the strike activity of the Norwegians, but because strike 
levels dropped by more in most of the other countries than in Norway.  
Finally in the 2000s (table 11) – with the lowest general level for WDL – 
we find again Spain, Italy and Finland among the top five, as in the 
1970s, but now Norway is among the ‘top’ countries, due to a very large 
conflict in 2000. Also, as a novelty, Austria has taken the second place 
that was occupied by Denmark in the 1990s. At the very bottom, the 
least strike-ridden countries are (in ascending order): Switzerland, the 
Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Portugal. 
A general conclusion on the country variation patterns would be that 
while some countries persevere in their position in the league table, in 
the high (Spain, Italy and Finland) or in the low end (Germany, 
Switzerland, the Netherlands and to some extent Portugal), others do 
change places and significantly so: Denmark is usually in the middle, but 
was high ranking in the 1990s, the UK used to be one of the most 
strike-ridden, but since the 1990s it is now in the middle or just below, 
while Norway seems to have moved relatively, in the opposite direction. 
Austria of course is a complete surprise. 
 
F.4. Why the Overall Declining Trend in Strikes? 
Finally, this article will discuss two aspects of the patterns detected: first, 
a discussion of potential explanatory factors behind the decline in 
strikes, and second some possible considerations concerning the still 
prevailing country differences. Some of the explanations suggested in 
the literature are the following: 
• Declining union density: The most evident one that comes to mind 
would be the general weakening of TU organization in Europe, 
first and foremost the decline in union densities. This decline is 
described in many sources (Ebbinghaus & Visser 2000; Visser 
1991; 1994; for the USA, see e.g. Kaufman 2004: 53), but it 
cannot really be the only explanatory factor: the fact is that even 
in countries with stable union densities in the period, strike 
levels have dropped significantly. 
• Declining CB coverage: Coverage has declined in some countries: in 
Germany in the period just from 1995 to 2001 from 83 to 71% 
in the West and from 73 to 56% in the East and in the UK in 
the period from 1984 to 1998 from 66 to 42%, quite significant 
                                                      
11 In total about 3.1 million WDL in ten days. 
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rates of decline).12 But in most other countries, as Traxler 
(1994) has shown, there is not a trend towards a general 
declining bargaining coverage. Countries with extension clauses 
and with extensive uses of them (Austria, France etc.) have not 
reduced their uses, while most countries with a less legalistic 
approach to CB coverage (such the Scandinavian countries) 
have not experienced this kind of decline. 
• Globalization with less state intervention and national protection: The 
existence and the strengthening of the EU, in combination with 
the gradually increasing impact of WTO imply less state 
protection of national companies and industries and less state 
financial intervention. The implication is that striking for state 
support to e.g. shipyards today has much less of an appeal to 
workers than it used to. At the same time, globalized 
competition means that some employees may face losing their 
work to third countries, should they strike too extensively. That 
globalization plays a role in pulling out the teeth of the labour 
movement and especially of the strike weapon is probably true 
in the general sense. 
• Sectoral and occupational changes: While any mention of a change 
from the production to the service economy might appear as 
old news, the ever-increasing trend from employment from 
manual worker to salaried employee may play a role, but the 
direction is ambiguous. Increased public employment may in 
fact increase the tendency to strike (due to the strong 
centralization on the part of the employer and the better 
employment security), while increases in the private service and 
the knowledge economy may pull in the opposite direction. 
• Individualization: This more general sociological factor may also 
contribute, although it is of course difficult to say why today’s 
employees should be so much more individualistic, and when 
that particular change took place. However, individualism may 
have better room for manoeuvre in a setting as today’s, making 
strikes a less attractive option, with the sacrifices involved. 
 
F.5. Strike Patterns: The ‘many cases of Europe’ 
Why do strike patterns differ in Europe, and why do these patterns seem 
to persist? Looking at the patterns analyzed above, it is tempting to state 
that we have in one end two countries with relatively quite high strike 
frequencies, Spain and Italy. Explanations for the perseverance of 
striking in these countries have been discussed elsewhere (Franzosi 1995; 
Rigby & Aledo 2001). While these authors point to several important 
factors at play, the most important one appears to be the fact that in 
sectoral bargaining, striking plays an almost integral role. In other 
                                                      
12 In the UK private sector from 48 to 25%. For Germany, see Müller-Jentsch & 
Weitbrecht (ed., 2003: 195); for the UK, see Millward et al. (2000: 96). 
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countries, such as the UK and the Scandinavian ones, pay bargaining 
including unofficial strikes typically takes place at the workplace level, 
something which doesn’t mean that they disappear, but that when they 
break out, it is only in a minority of companies and thus the toll in WDL 
becomes much smaller. Another factor seems to be political strikes, 
which have all but disappeared in Northern Europe, but which are still a 
fact of life in Italian and Spanish IR. It is tempting also to mention the 
very high employment security for workers in Spain and Italy (in Spain a 
legacy of corporatist Franco-Spain), which makes it a lot less risky for 
workers to go on strike.  
In the other end of the spectrum we find a number of countries with 
very low strike frequencies, both in absolute and relative terms: 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium and to some 
extent also Portugal. These are countries where there is no tradition of 
large political strikes, and where sectoral bargaining (under the theme of 
the “Tarifautonomie”, cf. Jacobi 2003), generally takes place without 
strikes or with strikes only few and far between. There are exceptions to 
this, especially Germany does have individual years with a larger number 
of WDL, but it comes nowhere near the tables with large losses in 
Southern Europe or in Scandinavia. It is interesting that the most recent 
English-language introduction to German IR only makes a few passing 
references to the issue of IC at all (Müller-Jentsch & Weitbrecht, ed. 
2003). One part of the explanation for the extraordinary labour peace in 
these countries might be (for Germany) the works council system, which 
gives employees much more say in the everyday business of their 
companies, and thus makes striking ‘against oneself’ appear meaningless. 
Finally, we have a number of European countries of the ‘middle range’, 
where there is some, but not overwhelmingly much IC. These include 
France, Ireland, the UK and all four Scandinavian countries. Here, 
strikes are still in use either in the recurring processes of local workplace 
pay bargaining, or as a political means of protest (or both). However, the 
uses of strikes in local bargaining or in connection with political protests 
(the latter mainly concerns France) is – contrary to what is the case in 
Spain and Italy – irregular and non-recurring: while local pay bargaining 
is recurring, it only sometimes gives rise to IC. Trade unions and EA 
therefore constantly monitor the area in order to contain the eruptions 
that do occur, something which in France is left to the politicians. 
It is worth noticing here that countries, whose institutional organization 
of the labour market are even quite different, as for instance those of the 
Scandinavian countries, France and the UK, today have levels for IC 
that hardly are distinguishable.13 France has the constitutional right to 
strike, the Scandinavian neighbours have the embargo on striking and 
lock-outs, and in the UK they have neither of these. What do these 
institutional differences mean to the general occurrence of IC? 
Apparently they do not mean a lot. If the workers wish to strike, the 
specific national institutional rules apparently is of little significance. 
This however can hardly be the truth, since the patterns in IC can be 
                                                      
13 This is in some ways surprising, and some observers might say that close study would 
reveal how legislation influences the pattern of strikes in the various countries. In the US, 
public sector strike bans have been shown to have effects (Hebdon & Stern 2003).  
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quite different, and as a lack of national rules naturally must be 
considered as potentially highly influential on the level. 
One might argue that high levels of striking, as in the 1970s, are 
unhealthy and self-defeating in a globalized economy as the one we have 
today. It’s a little like the right to quit a job: we consider it a basic 
democratic right and would consider it an infringement on individual and 
democratic rights if someone would politically try to take this right away. 
On the other hand, the individual employee when he or she quits 
(without another job at hand), always runs a risk and doing so repeatedly 
can also turn self-defeating. So the right to strike is there and is 
important, but extensive use is a symptom of ailments in the IR system. 
That is why it is fundamentally wrong to say e.g. that Scandinavia qua 
‘the Danish model’ has an especially peaceful labour market, as it is 
sometimes claimed by various ‘model defenders’ (Due et al. 1994). As 
Stokke has emphasised (1999: 28-30), IC of the Scandinavian countries 
have a level quite close to most other European countries. 
G. An attempted conclusion: Peace in our time? 
 
But what do the generally falling trends in IC mean? Will the labour the 
IC wither away or dry up in a not too distant future? Are strikes an 
extremely out-dated way of fighting? Or will the right to strike and the 
strike as a weapon on the other hand have to be used once in awhile if 
we are not to forget about it completely? Or can situations still occur, 
where the strike as a form of action still today and in the future will be 
the legitimate expression for the collective interest or collective protest 
of a specific group? Will there be “Peace in our time”? Or will the 
companies also in the future have to balance on the risk of conflict, 
when the collective agreements are to be renewed, or when the local 
wage negotiations take place? 
One could believe in “Peace in our time”. The strike figures are actually 
extremely small: The European strike level in the 2000s corresponds to 
43 WDL annually for every 1.000 employees (who each work approx. 
225 days a year), the loss of workdays due to strikes in other words 
make up barely 0,02% of all possible workdays or less than one fifth per 
thousand! 
On the other hand it is also easy to see from the analyses that the level 
of conflict in most countries seems to be declining from the 1970s to 
the 1990s, but from then on not really declining much further. One 
might interpret this trend in the way that the level of IC in Europe has 
dropped and converged to a level close to the level of France, the UK 
and Scandinavia, where it has then stabilized. The occurrence of 
spectacular strikes in connection with workplace closures and 
outsourcing is something, which may prevent the level from going 
towards nil, and these kinds of actions bring the attention of the public 
to processes that hit the employees, who otherwise may not have so 
much attention from the media. 
 33 
In a more general vein, one might ask for explanations in these patterns 
of two things that stand out: the generally declining level of IC and the 
persisting and substantial variation between European labour markets: 
IC levels in the 1970s and today relate by a factor of 8/1, and IC in ‘high 
level countries’ (Spain and Italy) relate to those in ‘low level countries’ 
(Germany, the Netherlands, by a factor of at least 30/1. These are 
substantial declines and substantial national differences. How can one 
explain this? 
 
Figure 3. 
Effects of economic and sociological-institutional 
factors in explaining strike variations in Europe. 
 
 Decline  Variation 
Unemployment   0  0 
Union density   (+)  0 
CB coverage   (+)  0 
Labour law (changes in)   (+)  + 
Changes in market protection   +  0 
Embeddedness   +  + 
 
Note: Effects are denoted as 0 = No effect; (+) = slight effect; + = clear effect. 
 
In Figure 3, six of the most important factors from the literature have 
been indicated, and my judgement of their importance has been given.  
 
o Unemployment levels play a substantial role in the economic 
literature, e.g. in the Ashenfelter and Johnson model (1969).14 
Judging from the patterns, it is quite clear, however, that neither 
the decline in IC nor the intra-national variation could be 
explained by unemployment. While IC fell in concert with 
increasing unemployment in the 1970s, the reversal of 
employment in the 1980s and onwards was not accompanied by 
increasing strike activity, neither generally nor in those countries 
benefiting most from improved employment conditions. 
o Union density and CB coverage may have had a slight effect on IC 
levels: both have been declining, especially density and this 
trend has not been reversed. As for the variation, however, it is 
certainly difficult to discern and connections between any of 
these two factors and IC: Both France and Germany have quite 
high CB coverage, but their IC levels vary substantially. 
o Labour law and changes in labour law has achieved some merit in 
the literature (Elgar & Simpson 1993; Hebdon & Stern 1998; 
                                                      
14 For a discussion of this model’s merits in the Italian case, see Franzosi 1995: 30-55. 
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2003), and clearly, especially for the variation between the 
European countries, national labour law has a substantial say. 
o Changes in market protection, meaning opening of national markets 
both due to EU regulation and to WTO arrangements, i.e. 
globalization probably plays a major role in explaining the 
decline in IC levels. Today, striking is much more risky for 
employees than it was in the 1970s, because short delivery times 
and Just-In-Time Logistics makes it a viable asset for a 
company to always deliver on time. These changes do nothing, 
however, to help us explain national variations. 
o Embeddedness, or history, i.e. predicting the IC level in one 
particular from the level the year or years before, seems to be an 
important factor. A tradition of IC in particular companies or 
industries becomes embedded as a ‘tradition’, which it then 
becomes legitimate to draw upon in particular situations.  
 
Thus, institutional factors seem to play a substantial role: legal-regulative 
institutions play a role in the dynamics of IC, while normative or 
cultural-cognitive institutions play a role in explaining national variation 
(cf. Scott 2001: 52). 
Finally, one could remark that strikes are most often a manifestation, 
maybe a cry for help, and the most important work in most cases begins 
after the strike: Employees can force the management to sit down at the 
negotiating table (again), however subsequently they after all have to 
find a solution through negotiation, a solution that will save their jobs, 
improve their pay or other conditions, they may be dissatisfied with. 
As a fundamental civic right the right to strike still is significant, but the 
actual occurrence of strikes can definitely not be seen as a simple 
expression for neither the strength of the labour movement (of for its 
weakness for that matter), as Korpi and Shalev have so eloquently 
pointed out. They must, however, be seen as an expression for the 
embedding of the actors in nationally specific negotiation relations, and 
their more or less rational action inside these. 
Strikes may presumably always be seen as the beginning of a process, 
not the end: By striking a group of employees can set a new agenda or 
put new things on the existing agenda. That way strikes have actually 
often been used. However, one can not strike his way all the way to 
victory. The victories are won at the negotiating tables, where the strike 
threat at times can be a useful piece to play in negotiations, which 
however instantly loses its value when it is played. Negotiation victories 
include admissions from both sides, and it is a negotiation process, 
which leads to that, which is difficult to unite with strikes and lockouts, 
where feeling are riding high, and the parties may have difficulties acting 
and considering things completely rationally.  
In other countries other solutions have been found (partly) to the same 
problems. The strike is still a significant civic right, but more as a type of 
emergency right than an “everyday right”. The rationally institutional 
labour market perspective can bring us quite far in the understanding of, 
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why open conflicts break out some times, and why one in other cases 
(luckily in most cases) can find the solution to the problem at the 
negotiating table. 
 36 
H. Appendix 
  
The strike level in 15 European countries – 
References and methodology 
 
All data are from ILO (the International Labor Organization), cf. the website 
http://laborsta.ilo.org (see however Germany) 
The calculations have been made by: 
Working days lost due to IC per year:  
 (The number of lost days due to IC year 1 / Number of employees year 1) * 
1,000 
Working days lost due to IC per period: 
 (((Number of lost days due to IC year 1 / Number of employees year 1) / 
1,000) + ((Number of lost days due to IC year 2 / Number of employees 
year 2) * 1,000) + ((The number of lost days due to IC year n / number of 
employees year n) * 1,000)) / n, where n is the number of years 
Number of participants in IC per period: 
 (Participants in IC per period/ number of employees in the same period) * 
1,000 
If nothing else is noted, averages are calculated from the following four periods: 
- 1970s: 1970-1979, 
- 1980s: 1980-1989, 
- 1990s: 1990-1999, 
- 2000s: 2000-2003, 
All years included see however notes on the individual countries below. 
Strikes and lockouts include the following types, where nothing else is noted: 
- Constitutional strikes 
- Unofficial (or Wildcat) strikes 
- Sympathy strikes 
- Political strikes or protest strikes 
- General strikes 
- Work stoppages initiated by employers 
- Rotating or revolving strikes 
- Sit-ins 
- Work to rule 
- Go-slows 
- Overtime bans 
Both workers directly and indirectly involved are included 
If nothing else has been noted, both workers directly and indirectly involved are included 
in the strike figures. In addition to regular paid employees, including part-time workers 
the statistics cover temporary, casual and seasonal workers. Unpaid family workers are 
not included, nor are workers who are laid off or workers absent on sick or annual leave 
or absent for any other reason.  
Below are the countries, which are included in the charts, mentioned in alphabetical 
order with the special conditions that apply to the figures for the specific country. 
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Austria 
From 1976-1993 independents and self-employed are 
not included the total employment. The number of 
workers involved is based on an 8-hour workday. 
Unofficial (or wildcat) strikes and lockouts, working to 
rule, go-slows, overtime bans and sit-ins are not 
included in the statistics. The statistics only include 
employees, who are directly involved. 
Due to lack of data the calculations do not include the 
following years: 
Total employment: 1970-1975 
Employees involved: 1970 
WDL: 1970, 1993 
Belgium 
The total employment is calculated from the total 
number of people 15 years or older, and only includes 
regular paid employees, and includes the professional 
part of the army. The charts concerning strikes and 
lockouts, involved number of employees, and WDL 
only comprise the private sector. Sympathy strikes, 
work to rule, and overtime bans are not included in the 
statistics. 
Due to lack of data the calculations made exclude the 
following years:  
Involved number of employees: 1981-1984, 1986, 1987, 
2003 
WDL: 1981-1984, 1986, 1987, 1999, 2001-2003 
Denmark 
The total employment is calculated from the group age 
15 to 66, after 1994 it also includes people from 66 to 
74 years of age. Before 1984 only the civilian workforce 
(i.e. the non-military) is included. Until 1995 strikes and 
lockout are not included, if the total number of WDL is 
less than 100. The WDL figures are all rounded off to 
the nearest 100. Work to rule, go-slows, overtime bans, 
and sit-ins are not included. 
Because of lack of data the calculations do not include 
the following years: 
Total employment: 1970, 1971, 1980, and 1982 
Involved number of employees: 1970 
WDL: 1970 
Finland 
The total employment is calculated from the group age 
15 to 74. Up until 1976 the professional part of the 
army is included too. Only strikes and lockouts that last 
longer than one hour are included. Strikes also include 
blockades. 
Due to lack of data the calculations do not include the 
following years: 
Involved number of employees: 1970  
WDL: 1970 
France 
The total employment is in 1970 to 1990 calculated 
from the total number of people 15 years or older. 
From 1991-2002 the total employment is only 
calculated from the civilian workforce. Local strikes and 
lockouts are includes, so that each company counts as 
one strike or lockout. Agriculture and civil service are 
not included. WDL are all rounded off to the nearest 
100. Strikes and lockouts have to have lasted at least 
one day to be included. Lockouts, work to rule, go-
slows, and overtime bans are not included.  
Due to lack of data the calculations do not include the 
following years: 
Total employment: 2003 
Employees involved: 1970, 2003 
WDL: 1970, 2002 and 2003 
Germany 
The calculations for total employment are based on 
everybody aged 15 or older. Prior to 1990 the total 
employment only includes the former West Germany 
(these data are from OECD: www.oecd.org).15 Up until 
1993 the number of WDL caused by IC only includes 
West Germany. As strikers are only included 
employees, who are involved directly, and only work 
stoppages initiated by employers, where at least 10 
employees are involved, and which lasts more than one 
day. Strikes, which last less than one day, are only 
included if more than 100 workdays are lost. 
Concerning employees involved the public sector and 
conscripts are not included. Lockouts, working to rule, 
go-slows, overtime bans and passive resistance are not 
included in the statistics. Trainees are included. 
Employees absent on sick or annual leave or absent for 
any other reason, e.g. education, are included. 
Due to lack of data the calculations do not include the 
following years: 
WDL: 1970 
Ireland 
The total employment is calculated from the total 
number of people 15 years or older. From 1986 only 
the civilian workforce is included. Strikes and lockouts, 
which lasted less than one day or with the number of 
aggregate days less than 10, are not included. 
Employees, who are sent home because of the strike 
and unpaid family employees are not included, nor are 
employees who are laid off or employees absent on sick 
or annual leave or absent for any other reason. Work to 
rule, go-slows, and overtime bans are not included. 
                                                      
15 The exact website address is: 
www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/members/lfsdataauthentic
ate.asp 
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Due to lack of data the calculations made do not 
include the following years: 
Employees involved: 1970, and 2003 
WDL: 1970 
Italy 
The calculations for the total employment are based on 
everybody 15 years or older and also include conscripts. 
Before 1974 are political strikes not included. 
Concerning the number of employees involved; the 
years 1971 and 1974 are without political strikes. All 
figures between 1971 and 1995 have been rounded off 
to the nearest 1000 and from 1996 rounded off to the 
nearest 100 before being included in the calculation. 
The calculations for the number of WDL are based on 
7-hour workdays and all figures have been rounded off 
to the nearest 100 before the comparison with the total 
number of employees. Work to rule and overtime bans 
are not included in the statistics. Furthermore, sit-ins 
have not been categorized. The statistics only include 
employees, who are directly involved. In the case of 
lockouts the employers are included as well.   
Due to the lack of data the calculations do not include 
the following years: 
Employees involved: 1970 
WDL: 1970 
The Netherlands 
The total employment is calculated from the group age 
15 to 64. In 1981 age 14 is included though and from 
1981 to 1987 all people over 15 years of age are 
included. Work to rule, go-slows, overtime bans and 
sit-ins are not included in the statistics. 
Due to lack of data the calculations made do not 
include the following years: 
Total employment: 1970-1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1984, 
1986, 2003 
Employees involved: 1970, 2002, and 2003 
WDL: 1970, 2003 
Norway: 
The calculation of the total employment is based on 
group age 15 to 74. Until 1980 the professional part of 
the army is included. Before 1986 unpaid family 
employees, who work less than ten hours, are not 
included. Strikes and lockouts which last less than one 
day are not included. Only employees who are directly 
involved are included. Work to rule, go-slows, overtime 
bans and sit-ins are not included. 
Due to the lack of data the calculations do not include 
the following years: 
Total employment: 1970 and 1971 
Employees involved: 1970 
WDL: 1970 
Portugal 
The calculations made for the total employment are 
based on the civilian workforce. Strikes and lockouts 
that last less than one day are not included and are not 
included in the number of employees involved. 
International organizations and embassies are not 
included. Strikes also include “bouchon” strikes 
(rotating or revolving strikes). Working to rule, go-
slows and overtime bans are not included. 
Due to lack of data the calculations do not include the 
following years: 
Employees involved: 1970 
WDL: 1970, 2003 
Spain 
Strikes and lockouts, which last less than one hour, are 
not included in the calculations. From 1976 to 1995 the 
total employment neither includes the self-employed 
nor the independent employees. From 1996 to 2003 the 
total employment is based on everybody 16 years or 
older. In the same time period independents and the 
self-employed are included, however the conscripts are 
not included in the total employment. Up until 1990 
lockouts and the Basque country are not included. 
From 1983-1985 Catalonia is not included. Up until 
1988 public servants did not have the right to strike, 
and they are therefore not included in the statistics. It is 
prohibited to strike in the army. Sit-ins and working to 
rule are not included. Only employees who are directly 
involved are included in the statistics. 
Due to lack of data the calculations do not include the 
following years:  
Total employment: 1970-1975 
Employees involved: 1970, 2003 
WDL: 1970 
Sweden 
The total employment is based on the group aged 16 to 
64 years. Before 1986 it is based on the group age 16 to 
74, though. The professional part of the army is 
included. Unpaid family employees, who work less than 
15 hours, are not included. Strikes and lockouts, which 
last less than 8 hours, are not included. Only 
employees, who are involved directly, are included. 
Employees absent on sick or annual leave or absent for 
any other reason, e.g. education, are included. Unpaid 
family employees and employees laid off are not 
included. Working to rule, go-slows and overtime bans 
are not included.  
Due to lack of data the calculations do not include the 
following years: 
Employees involved: 1970 
WDL: 1970  
United Kingdom 
The total employment does not include independents 
and the self-employed. The number of employees 
involved has been rounded off to the nearest 100, 
before being compared to the total number of 
employees. Strikes and lockouts with less than ten 
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employees involved or which last less than one day are 
not included, unless the total number of WDL is more 
than 100. Political or protest strikes, working to rule, 
go-slows and overtime bans are not included. 
Employees, who are indirectly involved, are here 
defined as those who do not participate, but cannot 
work because of the strike or lockout. Employees, who 
work at the same workplace but cannot work because 
of the strike, are included as employees directly 
involved. Employees at other workplaces, who are 
indirectly affected by the strike, e.g. because missing 
deliveries of materials or missing sales, are not included.  
Due to lack of data the calculations do not include the 
following years: 
Employees involved: 1970 
WDL: 1970 
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Table 2 
Trend for Scandinavia  
WDL per 1,000 employees per year 
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Table 3 
Trend for British Isles  
WDL per 1,000 employees per year 
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Table 4 
Trend for North-Western Continental Europe 
WDL per 1,000 employees per year 
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Table 5 
Trend for Southern Continental Europe  
WDL per 1,000 employees per year 
 
0
300
600
900
1200
1500
1800
2100
2400
1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003
Italy
Spain
Portugal
 
 46 
Table 6 
Trend for Central Continental Europe 
WDL per 1,000 employees per year 
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Table 7. 
Aggregate trend: Average number of WDL per year per 1,000 
employees, 1970-2003. 
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Table 8 
Average number of WDL per year per 1,000 employees in Europe. 
1970-1979. 
 
Figure 8
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
Average number of WDL per year per 1,000 employees in Europe. 1970-1979
Spain
Italy
UK
Finland
Ireland
Denmark
Belgium
France
Germany
Norway
Sweden
Netherlands
Portugal
Switzerland
Austria
 
 
Table 9 
Average number of WDL per year per 1,000 employees in Europe. 
1980-1989. 
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Table 10 
Average number of WDL per year per 1,000 employees in Europe. 
1990-1999. 
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Table 11 
Average number of WDL per year per 1,000 employees in Europe. 
2000-2003. 
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